

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 27, 2013

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** S.A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director

**FROM:** R.T. Davis and R.K. Verhaagen

**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Report for Week Ending September 27, 2013

### **Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (CMR) – Confinement Vessel Disposition (CVD)**

**Project:** This week, the CMR Facility Operations Director declared readiness to proceed with the CVD Federal Operational Readiness Review (ORR). This declaration identified that all necessary findings from the previously conducted Management Self Assessment and Contractor ORR have been closed. Additionally, directed changes to the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) to address field office comments from an ancillary review have been completed and their implementation verified.

Due to the current field office management structure, the DOE/NNSA Central Technical Authority has been designated the Startup Authorization Authority (SAA) for this activity. The field office has approved and forwarded the request recommending approval to the SAA. Pending this final approval, the Federal ORR is scheduled to commence September 30, 2013.

**Plutonium Facility – Safety Basis:** The Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis that was declared for the Plutonium Facility Control System/Ventilation System Function Test (see 8/9/13 weekly) resulted in an Unreviewed Safety Question. LANL submitted an Evaluation of the Safety of the Situation (ESS) to the field office this week for review and approval. The ESS concludes that no compensatory measures or operational restrictions are necessary and commits to revise the DSA and TSRs to clarify the appropriate safety function. Additionally, the test procedure in question will be revised to be consistent with the TSRs.

**Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF):** This week, LANL submitted a revision to the WETF DSA, TSRs, and Fire Hazards Analysis to the field office for approval. The field office and LANL personnel have conducted multiple workshops to resolve previous comments and identify specific safety basis changes needed to support near term facility restart. Approval of this safety basis change supports closure of Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis issues associated with the oxygen monitoring system, hot-inlet system, and Radioactive Control Safety Management Program. Following field office approval and implementation of the revised safety basis, a contractor and federal readiness assessment are scheduled. Restart of this facility is needed to support disposition of excess tritium inventory and legacy items and to allow completion of function test programmatic missions.

**Plutonium Facility – Seismic/Structural:** The field office recently approved changes to the Fiscal Year 2013 Performance Evaluation Plan scope associated with Plutonium Facility seismic and structural activities. Specific Technical Area 55 Reinvestment Project scope that has been delayed was replaced with the following tasks: 1) remove 1.9 kg of heat-source plutonium (HS-Pu) from the laboratory floor; 2) dismantle and reprocess 1.8 kg of HS-Pu from rejected fuel clads (completion depends on resumption of associated programmatic operations); 3) analyze building performance against the requirements in DOE-STD 1020-2012; 4) design and install anchorage for two electrical panels; 5) initiate anchorage upgrades for two unit substations; and 6) add loss of 130 VDC power indication associated with the safety-class seismic switches to the Facility Control System.